Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against server resources exhaustion are a major security threat to the Internet. A number of defense mechanisms have been proposed against such attacks. Recently, Aura et al. proposed a solution to resist DoS attacks against an authentication protocol. However, their puzzle solution cannot guarantee that all of their clients have fair computation time to solve a puzzle. The solution may even render some clients unable to obtain the puzzle solution within the lifetime, resulting in a lack of service from the server. In this paper, a simple solution as well as an applied authentication protocol was proposed.
Introduction
Recently, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks have become a major problem [2, 5, 26, 28, 29] . These attacks degrade the services' quality or temporarily deny the victim's resource availability, rather than subvert the victim's data or service permanently [10] . Such attacks are difficult to solve because they are not aimed at any specific weakness of a computer system [27] .
Through a very simple and powerful technique, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), an attacker can easily exhaust the resources of a victim within a short time. A DDoS attack system can usually be treated as a many-to-one dimension of the DoS problem [10, 13, 14] . In this attack mode, an attacker controls multiple handlers (masters) with a special program. With automatic scanning and propagation techniques, a handler is able to dominate multiple agents by searching out their system security holes and injecting malicious instructions [27] . The agents then generate the bogus packets and send them to the victim. This consequently paralyzes the services provided by the victim. DoS attacks to server resources exhaustion have become a major threat in today's Internet and other open communication systems [3, 21] . These valuable resources usually include CPU cycles, disk space, memory, network bandwidth, network connectivity, and certain environmental resources such as power [28] .
The service capabilities of a server are usually limited to the resources it holds.
Because the resources of a server are limited and valuable, eliminating a client can arbitrarily access the server resources. Therefore, the server usually implements an authentication protocol to verify the client before allocating any resources to it. Unfortunately, this creates a new opportunity for DoS attacks [3] . During the verification process, the server typically needs to spend its resources, such as buffer, storage (to store some specific session state), and some expensive computation (e.g. public-key-based operations) to accomplish an authentication before the client can gain access to the server. Therefore, an attacker can exploit DDoS techniques to launch and send many bogus authentication requests to a victim server. As a result, the server is paralyzed because of the exhaustion of its limited resources.
Client puzzles [1, 3, 5, 12, 16, 27] are one of the eminent solutions created to preclude such attacks. To solve the server resource exhaustion attacks by client puzzles protocol, a client is required to commit his or her resources to solve the puzzle before acquiring any reliable authentication from the server. Therefore, the protocol imposes a large computation burden on potential attackers, by requesting them to generate large volumes of legitimate service requests to exhaust the server resources. The client puzzles will increase the difficulty whether authentications are malicious or honest. The difference is that an honest client needs only to solve the puzzle once, so he/she has little influence; but a malicious client to launch Dos attack will be overloaded because many puzzles need to be solved by him; and therefore the server could also get breathing time.
Recently, Aura et al. proposed a client puzzle to defend the authentication protocol of a server from DoS attacks [3] . However, this puzzle solution cannot guarantee that all of the clients will have adequate fairness computation time to solve the puzzle. Considering the different input parameters in Aura et al.'s protocol, it is found that the client may not be able to solve a puzzle solution within a particular period of time. That is, there are numerous opportunities for some clients to receive no service from the server.
In this paper, a moderately difficult client puzzle protocol has been proposed to solve such problems. By utilizing a unique puzzle for each client, the solution guarantees that each client will receive services from the server within a particular period of time. Thus, legitimate clients only slightly degrade a connection request confirmation when the server is under attack, while attackers have to commit a large computational resource to interrupt the normal services of the server.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents related work, including a brief description of the weakness of Aura et al.'s client puzzles protocol. The flaws of Bocan's protocol are also included in this section. Section 3 describes the attack model to assist us in formulating the client puzzle protocol. Section 4 introduces the client puzzle protocol. Section 5 demonstrates a simple but efficient authentication protocol, which absorbs the characteristics of cryptographically generated address (CGA) into the proposed client puzzle protocol to defend against serial DoS attacks, for example, resource exhaustion attacks in server sites and malicious flooding. Section 6 valuates the security of the proposed protocol, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Related Works
First, existing client puzzle techniques were explored. Second, the weaknesses of Aura et al.'s protocol were briefly described. To enhance the protocol, the flaws of Bocan's protocol were analyzed and some improvements to the weaknesses were made in Section 2.3.
Client Puzzles
The most effective defense mechanisms of eradicating security loopholes is from their origins. The Internet is based on TCP/IP that was not designed for security in original version, so its insecurity is unavoidable [4] . Although
IPSec was introduced to protect the packet, it still has many problems that need to be solved [4, 9, 24] . Internet service providers (ISPs) are typically not motivated to embed router-based defense schemes into their routers because there are no direct benefits for them, or for their clients [27] . DoS as well as DDoS has now fully exploited the security weaknesses mentioned above to launch attacks by engaging in flooding attacks with IP spoofing. Therefore, the most effective way is to develop the server-based defense mechanisms because this side usually experiences the greatest weight of an attack. For this reason, potential victims are always willing to sacrifice some of their resources and performances to reinforce their defense capability [10] .
Client-puzzle was designed to enhance the capability of the server to defend against DoS and DDoS attacks.
According to [5] , the idea of cryptographic puzzles was developed from Merkle [20] . However, his puzzles were only applied to key agreement, not authentication. In 1999, Juels and Brainard proposed their client puzzles to protect victims' machines [16] . Their protocol focuses on defense against connection depletion attacks. This protocol is capable of combating attackers on internal networks, as well as the SSL protocol, which is vulnerable to com-putational exhaustion attacks. However, to complete a verification, a server requires m hash computations (m is number of sub-puzzles within a puzzle), and this is considered to be too expensive.
Recently, Aura et al. considered that Juels and Brainard only concentrated on connection depletion attacks, but ignored DoS attacks against authentication protocols. Therefore, they made some improvements to the protocol [3] . There are some studies to improve the client puzzles and to apply them to the actual application environment, for example, the Ma's Hash-chain-reversal puzzle [18] , and the lei et al.'s Quasi-Partial-Collisions puzzle [17] for the UMTS communication protocol. Since the IP-based network was already the present network protocol tendency, an applied authentication protocol based on our client puzzle protocol was also proposed in this paper, and that is suitable at the IP-based network environment.
A number of approaches concentrate on the client's memory resources [11] .
Although this paper is confined to CPU-intensive puzzles herein, this research will be explored in future work.
The Aura et al.'s Protocol
A sketch of Aura et al.'s protocol [3] is shown in Figure 1 . When the server suspects that it is under a DoS attack and its resources are becoming exhausted, it begins to broadcast a puzzle with a difficulty level greater than zero to all of its clients. The puzzle message contains a nonce N s from the server, and a value k, which demonstrates the puzzle difficulty level. The server generates a nonce N s periodically. The nonce should be unpredictable to prevent an attacker from pre-computing the puzzle solutions. The server sets k = 0 if no work is required for the client.
When a client receives a puzzle message and discovers that the value k is greater than zero, he or she should solve the puzzle according to the puzzle difficulty level k. The client first generates a nonce N c , then tries to solve the puzzle by finding the hash result in which the most significant bits are conformed to zero. For example, if k = 16, the client should find a hash result in which the most significant bits are composed of 16 zero bits. The client must repeatedly apply a hash function with a various values of X until a solution is found. This is the only efficient way to find a puzzle solution. No other short cuts exist [3, 5, 16, 28] .
After the client finds the puzzle solution X, he or she sends N c and X to the server. The server first verifies that N s is fresh, and that C, N s , andN c have not been used before. Afterwards, the server verifies the solution by employing only one hash function computation. If the solution is correct, the server stores C, N s , andN c . The server stores the correctly solved instances C, N s , andN c to prevent the client from re-using the same solution for many service requests.
The Bocan's Improved Protocol
Bocan first proposed a "strong attack" [5, 6] in 2004. A strong attack is defined as a DoS attack launched by an attacker who is able to access a massive computing power. With this attack, an attacker can gradually raise the puzzle up to impossible difficulty. Therefore, legitimate clients will never solve the puzzle. Bocan realized that Aura et al.'s protocol [3] was vulnerable to such strong attacks. Therefore, he suggested that when a server received a puzzle solution from a client, it should estimate the time that a client needed to solve a puzzle of difficulty k, using the formula:
In the formula, T estimated represents the estimated time for solving the puzzle, and T operation indicates the minimum time needed to perform a cryptographic operation. Bocan named a client puzzle by the above formula as threshold puzzle.
The Flaw of Their Protocols
In the Aura et al.'s protocol, the puzzle difficulty is represented by parameter k. To solve a puzzle of difficulty k, the expected number of steps for a client will be 2
, whilst the worst case will be 2 However, Bocan's protocol originated from Aura et al.'s idea, therefore, the weaknesses mentioned above were inherited. That is, Bocan's protocol may also cause a difference probability in solving the puzzle. It is difficult to estimate the time needed to solve a puzzle.
It is noted, however, that our moderately difficult client puzzle protocol needs two additional hash computations in the server site when compared with [3] and [5] . However, the protocol ensures that each client will have fair and adequate computation time to find the puzzle solution. Furthermore, the protocol provides a better way to estimate the time for solving the puzzle, which enhances the capability of Bocan's threshold puzzle.
Attack Model
To formulate our client puzzle protocol, the following assumptions were made:
It is assumed that clients C i come from the Internet, intending to receive some services from server S. Server S provides the services to C i after he or she has been verified. An attacker Adv (who controls a number of attack daemon agents) from a public network is trying to exploit the weaknesses of the authentication protocol, and launches a DDoS attack to deplete the resources (CPU cycles and memory) of the server S. The following assumptions were made about the situation of the attacker Adv and server S. Assumption 3: When participating in a DDoS attack, a normal user cannot feel any discomfort using the agent computer.
When participating in a DDoS attack, the agent program, located in the attack daemon agents, should use only a small amount of the resources (e.g. CPU cycle, memory and bandwidth). This assumption is related to Assumption 2. If Assumption 2 does not hold, the daemon agents would make efficient responses to S. As a result, a user of the agent computer will experience minimal changes in the computer's performance. The agent program may be removed later so to affect the attack plan of Adv.
Assumption 4:
The daemon agents will not receive the messages sent to the spoofed IP address.
According to Assumptions 1 and 2, it is assumed that the daemon agents, which use the spoofed source IP address, will not receive and can only intercept a limited number of messages sent to the spoofed IP address.
Adv may control the default router nearby S and attempt to copy the related messages; however, if he or she can do that, then he or she can mount a DoS attack by blocking all the traffic originating from S without having to overload it. Assumption 5: S is able to cope with any puzzle generation and verification.
Although this is a strong assumption, it remains reasonable for a current technology, and is essential for many defense protocols [3, 16, 22, 28] . If Adv can flood S with a large volume of related messages and paralyze the puzzle generation or verification, none of the defense protocols could resist the attacks. This assumption is considered to express the same idea in different words with Assumption 3 of [16] , and Assumption 2 of [28] .
It is believed that DoS attack instances can be reduced significantly if the source can be verified through authentication protocols. However, the authentication process may become another potential source of DoS attacks [24] . Therefore, to provide a DoS-resistant mechanism despite the authentication protocol employed by the server, a client puzzle mechanism to mitigate the destruction of DoS attacks was proposed.
The Proposed Client Puzzle Protocol
To provide DoS-resistant to authentication protocols, the client puzzle protocol is described fully in this section. Our protocol mitigates the destructiveness of DoS attacks to authentication protocols, which perform computationally expensive operations when verifying a client. The defense protocol can be employed not only to authenticate protocols, but also to other protocols vulnerable to DoS attacks during their execution.
We do not intend to introduce the authentication protocol suitable for our defense protocol in this paper. A server administrator should make this decision if he or she believes that the server is vulnerable to DoS attacks. The administrator can implement the defense protocol independently, or integrate the defense protocol into the authentication protocol, as described in Section 5.
The notations used in the proposed protocol and the remainder of this article are listed in Table 1 . Note that some of the notations, already defined in Section 3, are ignored here.
In the proposed client puzzle protocol, server S should decide the puzzle difficulty v i , according to its computational loading. The v i is an N bits random number generated according to the puzzle difficulty level. N is determined by the difficulty of puzzle. S stores v i -t l as an entry in its memory. If t l has expired, S will change v i into a new value, according to its computational loading. Moreover, S keeps both the current value of v i -t l and a set of previous entries v i−1 -t l−1 . The storage of v i−1 -t l−1 prevents some puzzles from being issued close to the expired time of v i−1 . S should accept the solution generated within t l−1 according to T estimated . For the sake of simplicity, v i /t l is exploited instead of the situation of v i−1 /t l−1 in the description below. Readers should be cautious of this abbreviation. Details of the defense protocol are described below. Figure 2 demonstrates our client puzzle protocol.
Step 1: To request services from server S, client C i sends its authentication request to server S.
Step 2: When S receives the authentication request, if it is overloaded (e.g. under attack), it sends C i a puzzle to solve. Otherwise, S authenticates C i directly. We consider S under attack herein.
Before starting any computation, S first checks the entry C i -t s stored in its memory. This is to ensure that one C i can only launch a corresponding puzzle generation before v i expires. Afterward S computes Therefore, the server does not need to store any information concerning the client applying the connection. This reduces the overload of server.
Therefore, S is stateless to any authentication request from C i .
Step 3: After C i receives the puzzle, he or she finds the solution v i , which is the leftmost 104-bit of a hash result equivalent to h l104 , received in
Step 2. The way of client usually to find solutions is the brute-force attack to test one by one until all possible solutions have to meet to find the solution. Once the solution has been found, C i sends the remaining 24-bit h r24 of the hash result, t s and cookies sc to S.
Step 4: Upon receipt of the puzzle solution, S first checks C i and t s to prevent double verification. If t s is fresh, S verifies the estimated time that C i should take to solve a puzzle of difficulty v i through a formula T estimated = (v i * T operation + t r ). Any puzzle solution, which arrives earlier than T estimated , is rejected, and the remaining verification process is ignored. Then, S verifies the puzzle solution using h r24 , the IP C i of the response message and another related value as the input parameter to
then the puzzle solution is correct. S stores C and t s as long as the corresponding v i /v i−1 and t l /t l−1 remain in its memory. S may now commit its resources to execute authentication protocol to verify C i .
In the simple modification of [3] and [5] , we proposed the client protocol 
The Proposed Authentication Protocol
In the next section, an authentication protocol based on IPv6 [8] is proposed.
The protocol absorbs the characteristics of CGA and employs them in the proposed moderately difficult client puzzle mechanism to defend against serial DoS attacks, for example, resource exhaustion attack in a server site and malicious flooding.
To open the forthcoming discussion, some understanding of the IPv6, as well as the related background, is necessary. We assume the reader is familiar with basic IPv6 architecture and function. Thus, we concentrate on stateless auto-configuration, how the CGA can be used in IPv6 and how it can be integrated into our client puzzle protocol to provide a simple authentication function.
In the basic stateless auto-configuration process, a booting host chooses its 64-bit interface identifier from the interface's MAC address as a link local IP address. The host then performs Duplicate Address Detection. Once the host has a link local address, it enters into the Router Discovery phase. The host learns the routing prefixes from the Router Advertisements. It is able to create globally routing addresses for itself. Therefore, the 128-bit IP address is divided into a routing prefix and an interface identifier. Because a host cannot change the routing 64-bit address prefix, the CGA focuses on the lower 64-bit interface identifier (link local IP address). The CGA address holds some good characteristics to prove that the address is not only used but also owned by a host. Therefore, IP spoofing can be eliminated [7, 22] . CGA was first proposed by O'shea and Roe [25] to secure binding updates in Mobile IP Version 6 (MIPv6) [15] when IPSec AH was not available. The later improvements can be found in [9, 24] . In CGA, it assumes that a global or centralized public key infrastructure (PKI) or key distribution center (KDC)
is not available. All of its securities are based on the probability difficulty of producing duplicate addresses, as described in [22] . We make some variations herein to make CGA not only solve the address ownership problem [23] , but also to authenticate itself to the server. We named the CGA with a certificate from a trust third party as VCGA (Variant-CGA).
To request services from server S, client C i should ensure that the IP address (more accurately, the part of interface identifier) is derived from the following computation:
The imprint acts like a salt in UNIX system to limit certain types of attacks [22] . As suggested in [24, 25] , only 62 bits of the lower IPv6 address can be used to store a cryptographic hash of a public key. The other two bits have the semantics defined for EUI-64 global identifiers [25] . We use these 62 bits hostID instead of the interface identifier in IPv6. Through the characteristics of VCGA, an attacker is hard to perform IP spoofing. Additionally, a simple authentication can be achieved. We show the related security analysis in Section 6.
The proposed authentication protocol shown in Figure 3 is a variation of the proposed client puzzle protocol described in Section 4. It is a practical DoSresistant authentication protocol, built to defend against resources exhaustion attacks in server sites.
Before starting any computation, S first checks the entry C i -t s stored in its memory. This is to ensure that one C i can only launch a cor-responding puzzle generation before v i expires. Afterward S computes S remains stateless to any authentication request from C i . The server gives the client the answer expected cookies SC in the proposed protocol, then uses the secret key SK S and Hash function to protect this answer.
Therefore, the server does not need to store any information concerning the client applying the connection. This reduces the overload of server.
Step 3: After C i receives the puzzle, he or she performs a brute force to search out the solution v i , which the leftmost 104-bit of a hash result equivalent to h l104 received in Step 2. Once the solution is found, C i sends the remaining 24-bit h r24 of the hash result, t s , imprint as well as cookies sc as M to S. A signed M and cert i are also sent to S. The public key P K i and imprint should be the elements used to create the 62 bits hostID.
The VCGA employed herein also signifies that C i is prevented from using a spoofed IP address IP C i in Step 2.
Step 4: Upon receipt of M , (M )sign and cert i , S checks C i and t s and verifies Because the original CGA assumes that a trustworthy PKI is not available, its self-created public or private key by C i is difficult to declare the crime of an attacker judicially through the law (because there are no trusted third parties to prove the identity of an attacker).
Because the server only accepts those clients who can prove their ownership of the source IP address, the authentication protocol eliminates IP address spoofing. A malicious client is prevented from flooding a victim, because now he or she needs to prove ownership of the IP address with a signature.
Security Analysis
In the protocols above, upon receipt of the authentication request from client C i , server S begins with a h(C i , IP C i , t s , v i ) computation. S will then take the leftmost 104-bit of hash results to perform a puzzle requirement. Afterward C i is required to find the v i , which results in the leftmost 104-bit of the hash output (say h l104 ) being equal to h l104 . S will then verify the solution of the puzzle. We assume that the hash function h(·) used in the defense protocol is a random function. For each input, the output of h(·) is uniformly distributed in {0, 1} b , where b is the security parameter.
To simplify our security analysis, we state the analysis in the form of a proposition and divide it into two aspects: the analysis of the proposed client puzzle protocol, and the analysis of the authentication protocol.
Analysis of the Proposed Client Puzzle Protocol
The analysis made in this subsection does not take the succeeding authentication method into account. We ignore the existence of the proposed authentication protocol, as demonstrated in Section 5 herein.
Proposition 1: The probability to find a collision of h(·) is no more than 2
−(104−1)
.
Note that if we curtail the leftmost 104-bit of the hash function output into a small number of sizes, say 8-bit, for every hash function output, whose leftmost 8-bit fits with the 8-bit puzzle requirement sent by S, will be an acceptance solution. Therefore the probability of finding an 8-bit collision of h(·) becomes 2
. This is an unacceptable probability because of its very large size.
We exploit the leftmost 104-bit of hash function output as a puzzle requirement to C i . This is to ensure that the collision of the hash function becomes negligibly small. In this situation, the probability of finding a collision of h(·) is no more than 2
. Therefore, the only efficient way to find h l104 is through brute force until the solution v i is achieved.
Although 104-bit increases the message length in transmission, it can provide a higher security to resist collision. The server administrator should consider this tradeoff.
Proposition 2:
The maximum time taken by C i to obtain h l104 ≡ h l104 is limited to v i .
In the defense protocol, the number of times taken by C i to find the correct value of v i is set by S in advance. S can estimate the time needed to complete the corresponding puzzle, using a simple calculation v i * T operation . Henceforth S can accurately control a difficult puzzle.
Because S randomly varies v i when t l has expired, the efficient way to obtain v i is through brute force.
Note that the increasing length of value v i demonstrates that C i should take more time to seek out the solution. S should control the size of v i as an appropriate difficulty, and ensure that each client can solve the puzzle within the lifetime t l of v i .
Proposition 3:
Under appropriate estimation to t r , S can assure that each client will have adequate time to solve the puzzle.
We make Proposition 3 essentially to defeat potential Adv, who can launch strong attacks [5] . We suggest the calculation of T estimated should have some cushioning to mitigate the affect of various CPU powers of each client, for example, loosen the restriction of T operation . On the other hand, appropriation of the estimated value of t r is beyond the scope of this paper. We reject the discussion of t r herein.
Proposition 4: Adv will be defeated if he or she has a puzzle solution v i but lacks cookies sc .
Although Adv can copy the v i and multiply many puzzle solutions to S, the lack of cookies issued to each previous authentication request message will make S discover the deception of Adv. Therefore, to limit the reuse of puzzle solutions, S places its secret key sk s into the computation of cookies sc . Any client who has the puzzle solution should affix the related cookies sc to S. The server uses the cookies sc to prevent IP spoofing. Therefore, any Adv who uses spoofed IP must make sure that he or she can obtain the corresponding cookies sc . Because of Adv with a randomized source of IP is hard to control the flow of corresponding messages. Adv makes it difficult to obtain enough cookies sc in the environment of the Internet.
Although Adv can use a real IP address to receive cookies sc and perform the related puzzle solving, he or she may confront liability if the attack is traced back. In the meantime, Adv also violates Assumptions 2 and 3 in Section 3 which are the common rules to observe when participating in a DDoS attack.
Proposition 5: With stored entry C i -t s , C i as well as Adv is prevented from performing double puzzle generation and verification.
Because the CPU cycles of S is valuable, we examine the C i and t s in
Steps 2 and 4 of the proposed protocol before we began any computation.
There are two reasons for this. First, a client can only achieve his puzzle generation or verification no more than one time before t l expires. Upon However, he/she will face difficulties as we described in Proposition 4.
Analysis of the Proposed Authentication Protocol
The authentication protocol inherits all of the security virtues of the proposed client puzzle protocol described above. We ignore the duplicate descriptions herein.
Theorem 1: The probability of the duplicate VCGA address is small and acceptable in reality.
By birthday paradox, there is a 50% probability of collision after trying
n/2 [19] . In VCGA addresses, only 62 bits are actually usable to store a cryptographic hash of a public key. If n = 62, we need 1.2 × 2
31
, that is, 2.58 billion hosts on an average before any two of them produce identical addresses. Therefore, it is acceptable in reality, if we consider this collision harmful only if the two hosts are in the same site (e.g.
they are using the same 64-bit prefix) and have the same correspondent server. This probability is very unlikely. Additionally, the duplicate address detection prevents this collision from happening.
Theorem 2:
The owner of an IP address can be identified by VCGA.
In an original CGA, a global or centralized PKI or KDC is not available; therefore a client self-creates a public or private key pair. The CGA reduces the construction of trusted third parties. It seems efficient, but it is, in fact, insecure.
The security of CGA is based on the belief that to obtain an IP address via a hash of the public key is safe, and that it is difficult for an attacker to generate a corresponding private key to make a signature. Because 62 bits are too few to gain strong security [24] , and imprint is not a secret value as expected for HMAC use, therefore, by brute force, an attacker can generate many public or private key pair to find a collision (the hash result of a public key is a collision with another client, that is, two hostID). As a result, the attacker can claim that he/she is the owner of some IP addresses, because he or she can provide a correct signature to the corresponding parties. The lack of trusted third parties makes these weaknesses unavoidable.
Our authentication protocol is based on general public key cryptosystems; therefore each client obtains his or her public or private key pair and a corresponding certificate cert i . With cert i , there is no way for an attacker to impersonate someone, because now he or she needs to obtain the actual private key, corresponding to the public key, enrolled in cert i .
Because server S verifies its clients when they request services, only the true clients obtain the authority of S and are permitted to access the resources. According to this concept, the proposed authentication protocol employs the public key enrolled in cert i to improve the security of CGA.
Because S can verify the identity of a client via VCGA address and the related signature, the owner of an IP address can be identified unquestionably through the utilization of cert i . It is useless for an attacker to find a collision of someone's IP address by brute force, and claim that he or she is the owner of the IP address with a fake signature.
Theorem 3:
With the characteristics of VCGA, the malicious client flooding can be precluded in the proposed authentication protocol.
Because hostID is derived from HASH 62 (public key|imprint), with a fixed public key from the certificate cert i , an attacker cannot generate a victim's IP address and launch flooding attacks if he or she does not know the victim's value of imprint. Although the imprint is not a secret value as expected for HMAC use, it severely limits the attacks to only those victims with a privileged location and within a certain time period [22] .
The only way to launch malicious client flooding [9] is to lure the server S into believing that the service request is coming from a proper client.
By doing so, an attacker first needs to obtain the designated victim's imprint and generate the related IP address. Second, the signature on the related message should be approved by S. Because the attacker does not know the private key of the victim, a verifiable signature can be created, using the attacker's true cert i and signature. The consequences of the attacks are serious, the true certificate cert i and signature will make the attacker punishable by law. The original CGA lacks these advantages.
Discussions and Conclusions
To simplify our performance analysis, we state the analysis in two aspects: Undoubtedly, DDoS attacks against the server resource exhaustion are already becoming a major security threat. In a business environment, a server needs to verify its clients through various authentication protocols, before providing any services. However, such a verification may result in DDoS attacks, especially for those heavy loading authentication protocols, for example, public-key-based operation. Therefore, it is important to provide a defense mechanism to resist such attacks.
We have presented a defense protocol to combat DDoS attacks. The protocol provides a guarantee to all the clients, which has adequate computation time to find the puzzle solutions. We improve the shortcomings of Aura et al.'s protocol by bringing up an idea fairness computation time. Moreover, S is stateless to any authentication request from C i in the proposed. It can reduce the load of the server even more in the face of numerous connections of the DoS attack.
To improve the weaknesses of CGA, we propose an idea called VCGA.
The proposed authentication protocol with VCGA not only eliminates the drawbacks from IP spoofing and malicious client flooding, but also inherits all the security virtues of the proposed client puzzle protocol.
Each client is able to access the authentication protocol after he or she solves the puzzle. However, an attacker who intends to lure a server into performing heavy authentication protocol computations will be confronted with various difficulties. 
